REBUILDING ILLINOIS BRICK: A
FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO THE
INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE
BARAK D. RICHMAN ∗ & CHRISTOPHER R. MURRAY †

ABSTRACT
The landmark case of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which denied
standing to indirect purchasers to sue antitrust violators, has been
subjected to steady and widespread criticism since it was decided in 1977.
Despite three decades of dissatisfaction, however, debate over indirect
purchaser standing has failed to generate satisfying solutions that meet the
objectives of antitrust law and reflect its underlying principles. We
attribute the lack of creative alternatives to an undue emphasis on legal
formalism, fostered both by the Supreme Court’s elaboration of the indirect
purchaser rule and the doctrine’s failure to recognize the pervasiveness of
multilayer supply chains. In this Article, we argue for a return to
functionalist antitrust objectives. We review the development of the
doctrine, explain its descent into formalism, identify its significant
shortcomings, and offer a comprehensive framework that addresses the
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difficult problem of antitrust standing. Building off that framework, and
drawing on lessons from securities law, we propose a mechanism that
opens antitrust suits to indirect purchasers, consolidates multiple claims
into a single proceeding, and designates a presumptive lead plaintiff. Such
a mechanism will enhance the impact of underenforced antitrust laws,
restore compensation to injured parties, and reduce the administrative and
agency costs of parallel litigation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Supreme Court ruled thirty years ago in Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois 1 that indirect purchasers may not bring private actions
against antitrust violators in federal court, 2 the “indirect purchaser
doctrine” has been subject to widespread and steady criticism. Critics of the
rule regularly highlight its denial of compensation to the parties most
1. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
2. The rule applies to private causes of action brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (2000). Ill. Brick. Co., 431 U.S. at 728–29.
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injured by antitrust violations, its effective amnesty to violators, and the
growing rift between the justifications for the rule and the protracted effects
of its application. 3 In recent years, dissatisfaction with Illinois Brick (and,
to a lesser extent, its predecessor Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp. 4 ) has reached a boiling point, with disaffected plaintiffs,
courts, and policymakers demanding that Congress intervene. These
demands culminated in April 2007 when the Antitrust Modernization
Commission (“AMC”), established by Congress to propose reforms to
antitrust law, recommended a legislative repeal of both Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick. 5
Despite the renewed attention from policymakers and academics, the
current debate over proposed reforms to the indirect purchaser doctrine
suffers from a poverty of satisfying solutions. After several decades of
sparring over the relative merits of the foundational decisions that
established the rule—with one commentator remarking on the “near
religious fervor” of the debate 6 —viewpoints have become ossified and the
debate has grown stale. Proposed reforms have been largely limited to two
choices: whether to overturn Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe, and whether
to preempt state laws that permit indirect purchaser actions. 7 The AMC’s
proposed reforms reflect the rigidity of this debate, offering only the
familiar critiques of the indirect purchaser problem without widening
discussion or developing innovative alternatives. Regrettably absent from
this policy debate is a comprehensive approach that advances the
functionalist principles of modern antitrust law within the structured
realities of the modern economy. Since much of the Illinois Brick saga—
the doctrine’s development and the subsequent debate it prompted—is a
story of misplaced emphasis on legal formalism, a return to functionalism
may provide innovative and useful alternatives.
This Article offers a comprehensive functionalist approach to the
problem of indirect purchaser standing. Part II traces the origins of the
3. See infra Part III.
4. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
5. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (2007),
available at http://www.amc.gov/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf [hereinafter AMC
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS]. The AMC was created by Congress to evaluate, and if appropriate,
recommend changes to the antitrust laws. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, §§ 11052–11053, 116 Stat. 1856. The AMC proceedings are discussed in Part II.D.
6. Edward D. Cavanagh, Illinois Brick: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 1, 3 (2004).
7. The full range of proposed solutions is discussed in Part II.D.
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current rule, demonstrates how an “unhappy chronology” 8 and an
unnecessarily dogmatic adherence to stare decisis gave rise to the indirect
purchaser rule, and outlines the history of the limited, and unfortunately
fruitless, debate over alternative solutions. Part III describes the
shortcomings of the rule—its denial of compensation to antitrust victims,
its failure to advance the paramount objective of deterrence, and its
exacerbation of complexity in litigation—while identifying the functional
objectives that should serve as the basis for antitrust rules of standing. It
concludes that antitrust standing rules, just like antitrust substantive rules,
should pursue the well-recognized goals of deterrence, compensation, and
judicial efficiency, while recognizing the realities of negative-value
lawsuits and the agency costs of attorney-driven class actions.
Part IV then applies these foundational objectives to offer a new
framework to the indirect purchaser problem. Our approach begins by
understanding the policy challenge as an effort to craft standing rules
governing an upstream antitrust violator that produces goods that descend
into a multilayered distribution chain. The essence of the challenge is to
manage litigation that might arise from a single anticompetitive act that
subsequently injures multiple parties. Borrowing from the experiences of
private securities litigation and mass torts, we craft a proposal for a
consolidated action that permits joinder by injured parties throughout the
supply chain. We further propose a lead plaintiff provision that rewards the
detection of antitrust violations while placing the consolidated action under
the control of those who would represent the injured parties and manage
the proceeding effectively. We believe this solution enhances deterrence by
expanding incentives to detect antitrust violations and sue violators,
increases compensation to injured parties, and reduces the severe cost and
complexity of parallel and multijurisdictional litigation.
II. THE RISE OF THE INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE
Often referred to as the Illinois Brick rule, the indirect purchaser rule
is actually the product of two separate Supreme Court decisions that
wrestle with the problems associated with a multiparty supply chain. The
first allows a direct purchaser to recover the full amount of an illegal
overcharge regardless of whether that cost is passed on to downstream
buyers. 9 The second denies standing to downstream buyers regardless of
8.
9.

Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 765 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 489.
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how much of the overcharge was passed on to them. 10 The chronology of
the case law is critical to understanding how a rigid bar on indirect
purchaser suits came about and why it has proven such a difficult mistake
to correct.
A. HANOVER SHOE
The doctrine began with Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp. 11 United Shoe was found to have illegally monopolized
the market for shoe-manufacturing equipment by, among other practices,
forcing shoe manufacturers to lease—rather than buy—its best
equipment. 12 Hanover Shoe, a shoe manufacturer and lessee of United
Shoe’s equipment, sued under section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides
a private cause of action for trebled damages to parties “injured” by
antitrust violations. 13 In its defense, United Shoe argued that any
overcharge paid by Hanover Shoe did not amount to injury under section 4
because Hanover Shoe had passed on the cost to its customers in the form
of higher downstream prices. 14
The district court rejected United Shoe’s “passing on” 15 defense,
reasoning that Hanover Shoe’s “injury occurred when it was charged too
much for the machinery” and that “[t]he general tendency of the law, in
regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step” and exonerate
a defendant because of “remote consequences.” 16 In an opinion by Justice
10. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 746–47.
11. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 481.
12. Id. at 483. United Shoe was found to have violated the antitrust laws in separate proceedings
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). Under section 5 of
the Clayton Act, that case established prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation actionable by
injured private parties under section 4 of that Act. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 484–87.
13. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
14. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 487–88. United Shoe argued that if Hanover Shoe “had bought
machines at lower prices, [it] would have charged less and made no more profit than it made by
leasing.” Id. at 488.
15. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 830 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
16. Id. at 829–30 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533
(1918)). The Third Circuit twice endorsed the district court’s rejection of the pass-on defense, first in
affirming the decision in the separate trial, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 281 F.2d
481, 481 (3d Cir. 1960) (finding the lower court’s reasoning “thoroughly convincing”), and a second
time on appeal from the main trial, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 377 F.2d 776, 782
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Byron White, an undivided Supreme Court agreed, 17 ruling that an injury
under section 4 is suffered whenever an illegally high price is paid,
regardless of the buyer’s subsequent actions. 18 The Court thus held that a
plaintiff’s recoupment of economic harm does not limit a defendant’s
liability in a section 4 claim. 19
The Court’s conclusion relied on two functional objectives: avoidance
of litigation complexity and deterrence. 20 The Court stated that even if a
pass-on defense were allowed, it would be hopelessly difficult to apply. 21
Calculation of a pass-on would depend on “virtually unascertainable”
elements such as other inputs in pricing decisions, the effect of higher
prices on sales volume, and the effect of changes in output on marginal
cost. 22 Deterrence would suffer as well, the Court reasoned, because a
pass-on defense would reduce the potential recovery to direct purchasers
and therefore reduce their incentive to sue. 23 It would also fragment
potential recovery among numerous indirect purchasers, each of which
“would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a
class action.” 24 The Court did leave open an exception for “cost-plus”
contracts, in which indirect purchasers buy a fixed quantity at a fixed
(3d Cir. 1967), aff’d in part, 392 U.S. 481, 488 (1967).
17. The Court was undivided in rejecting the pass-on defense, though Justice White was joined
by only six other justices. Justice Marshall did not participate in the decision and Justice Stewart’s lone
dissent did not reach the Court’s conclusion on pass-on. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 510–13
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 489 (majority opinion).
19. Id. at 490, 490–91 n.8 (“‘As it does not attribute remote consequences to a defendant so it
holds him liable if proximately the plaintiff has suffered a loss.’” (quoting S. Pac. Co., 245 U.S. at 533–
34)).
20. Though the Court’s analysis begins with a reference to proximate cause, that reasoning does
not drive the opinion. Rather, the Court’s initial use of tort causation language is best seen as defining
the scope of recoverable injury in terms of the harm that was caused by the antitrust violation. This is
consistent with the Court’s references to language in the Clayton Act regarding “injur[y]” to “property”
lost by the plaintiff. Id. at 488–89 (quoting section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000)). Indeed,
if proximate cause really did require that damages calculations “not . . . go beyond the first step,” id. at
490 n.8, then there would be no room for a cost-plus contract exception, see infra notes 25–26 and
accompanying text.
21. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493 (noting as to causation, “there would remain the nearly
insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised
his prices absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued”).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 494.
24. Id. (voicing the concern that “those who violate the antitrust laws . . . would retain the fruits
of their illegality because no one was available who would bring suit against them”). The Court’s
deterrence reasoning did not, however, extend to the disincentivizing effect of increased litigation costs
from the complex calculation of pass-on or the incentive-enhancing effect of allocating recovery for
more injury than was actually sustained. These arguments appear later in the Illinois Brick decision. See
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745–46 (1977).
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markup, 25 but this exception illustrates the rule. The Court reasoned that
since under such contracts it is “easy to prove that [the direct purchaser]
has not been damaged,” the motivation behind rejecting the pass-on
defense—a fear of complexity—is undermined. 26 In short, both the rule
and its limitations highlight that the decision to grant relief for passed-on
injury was founded upon a pragmatic and functional rationale.
B. ILLINOIS BRICK
Cracks in Hanover Shoe’s foundation appeared nine years later when
the Court divided over a critical question begged by Hanover Shoe:
whether downstream buyers may sue for overcharges passed on to them. In
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 27 indirect purchasers of concrete blocks sued
the manufacturer even though they had purchased the blocks through
contractors and other resellers. 28 As the Court explained, “[t]he only way in
which the antitrust violation alleged could have injured respondents is if all
or part of the overcharge was passed on by the masonry and general
contractors to respondents, rather than being absorbed at the first two levels
of distribution.” 29
Speaking for a 6-3 majority, Justice White—author of the Hanover
Shoe decision nine years earlier—denied standing to the indirect
purchasers. 30 From beginning to end, the Illinois Brick opinion was
wrapped tightly with Hanover Shoe. 31 Justice White’s two-step analysis
25. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
26. Id. The exception suggests that avoiding complexity was more important to the Hanover
Shoe Court than deterrence. Indeed, deterrence would be just as affected by fragmentation of potential
recovery among indirect purchasers with a cost-plus contract as without. This analysis of Hanover Shoe
appears in Illinois Brick. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 733 n.13. Significantly, the nonexclusive wording of
the exception—“We recognize that there might be situations—for instance, . . . a pre-existing ‘costplus’ contract . . . .”—indicates the Court anticipated future exceptions as cases arose where functional
considerations would not be advanced by application of the rule. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494. An
additional exception for a defense where the alleged violator’s sale price was the same as that required
by law, id., sheds little light on the reasons for denying the pass-on defense, but instead goes to actual
cause.
27. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 720.
28. Id. at 726.
29. Id. at 727.
30. Id. at 721, 736. Though the Hanover Shoe Court was undivided on the question of a pass-on
defense, see supra note 17, the Illinois Brick Court split 6-3 on the question of indirect purchaser
standing.
31. See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 723–26. The first line of the opinion is a citation to Hanover
Shoe. Id. at 723–24. The second paragraph recites complexity and deterrence rationales for the Hanover
Shoe decision; the third paragraph characterizes the legal issue as being the same one decided in
Hanover Shoe, casting plaintiff’s claim of pass-on injury as the mirror image of the Hanover Shoe
defendant’s claim of a pass-on defense. Id. at 724–26 (“In this case we once again confront the question
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first established a rule of symmetry: “whatever rule is to be adopted
regarding pass-on in antitrust damages actions, it must apply equally to
plaintiffs and defendants.” 32 In other words, if a pass-on defense is not
available to combat a suit from a direct purchaser, a pass-on justification
may not be available to a downstream plaintiff. Denying the pass-on
defense while permitting the indirect purchaser’s suit, Justice White
reasoned, threatened “a serious risk of multiple liability for
defendants . . . .” 33
Having thus limited itself to two options—“either we must overrule
Hanover Shoe . . . or we must preclude [the indirect purchasers] from
seeking to recover on their pass-on theory” 34 —the Court let stare decisis do
the remaining work. 35 Turning to Hanover Shoe, the Court retraced the
basis for that opinion and satisfied itself that it had reached the correct
conclusion. Again emphasizing the danger of potential complexity in
calculating pass-on damages, the Court reasoned that “[h]owever appealing
this attempt to allocate the overcharge might seem in theory, it would add
whole new dimensions of complexity to treble-damages suits and seriously
undermine their effectiveness.” 36 And in highlighting the centrality of
deterring future antitrust violations, the Court affirmed its conclusion in
whether the overcharged direct purchaser should be deemed . . . to have suffered the full injury . . . .”).
32. Id. at 728 (introducing the two-step analysis).
33. Id. at 730. The Court relied on Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), for
the proposition that the Court had already declined to “open the door to duplicative recoveries . . . .” Ill.
Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 731 (quoting Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 264). The dissent was similarly
concerned with multiple liabilities, though it argued that procedural mechanisms, already in wide use in
lower courts, were adequate to facilitate allocation of damages among direct and indirect purchasers. Id.
at 761–64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority found these procedures inadequate, holding that even
a risk of “a little slopover on the shoulders of the wrongdoers” was unacceptable and merited a per se
ban on pass-on. Id. at 731 n.11 (majority opinion) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Ill. Brick
Co., 431 U.S. 720 (No. 76-404)).
34. Id. at 736.
35. The Court noted that stare decisis is particularly important in cases of statutory interpretation
where Congress is free to amend the law, declaring in a footnote that “[s]hould Congress disagree with
this result, it may, of course, amend the section to change it.” Id. at 735 n.14. The dissent jumped on
this comment, noting that Congress did recently express its view that indirect purchasers had standing.
Id. at 756–58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
passed one year earlier, granted state attorneys general standing to sue as parens patriae on behalf of
their states’ citizens. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
90 Stat. 1383. Because consumers are generally indirect purchasers, the dissent reasoned that Congress
must have assumed that indirect purchasers had standing to sue. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 756–58
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 737. The Court also expressed its concern that procedural devices,
such as joinder, would be inadequate to handle the complexity of pass-on cases and might even add
irresolvable complexity themselves. Id. at 740–41 (presenting a parade of horribles regarding the
difficulty of indirect purchaser suits).
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Hanover Shoe that dividing potential recovery among tiers of indirect
purchasers would unacceptably dilute the incentive to sue. 37
The three dissenters voiced concern that the Illinois Brick result
abandoned another functional concern: compensating injured parties. 38
Justice Brennan, in a vigorous dissent that was joined by Justices
Blackmun and Marshall, protested that barring suits from indirect
purchasers would cause consumers to ultimately bear the harm from
antitrust injuries with no available avenue for relief. 39 The Illinois Brick
approach, he argued, forced a trade-off between ensuring compensation and
enhancing deterrence, 40 and “from the deterrence standpoint, it is irrelevant
to whom damages are paid, so long as someone redresses the violation.” 41
Indeed, Justice White agreed that compensation was a functional objective
of the Clayton Act, but the majority was “unwilling to carry the
compensation principle to its logical extreme” if it impaired deterrence. 42
37. Id. at 734–35 (“[A]ntitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full
recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers . . . .”).
38. Id. at 748–49 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting both the compensation and deterrence
objectives of Congress).
39. Id. at 749, 764 (“[I]n many instances, consumers, although indirect purchasers, bear the brunt
of antitrust violations. To deny them an opportunity for recovery is particularly indefensible when direct
purchasers . . . pass on the bulk of their increased costs to consumers farther along the chain of
distribution.”).
40. See id. at 751–53.
41. Id. at 760. Though the core disagreement between the Illinois Brick majority and dissent
involves a foundational dispute over the principal motivations underlying antitrust law, the majority’s
opting for deterrence over compensation is consistent with the Court’s other rulings in antitrust cases.
For example, in Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978), the Supreme Court ruled
that foreign antitrust plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages because ruling otherwise would dilute
private enforcement. The Court conceded in Pfizer that “Congress’ foremost concern in passing the
antitrust laws was the protection of Americans,” but pursuing American interests meant deterring
conduct that harmed the American market rather than construing standing rules so that compensation
was reserved to American parties. Id. at 314.
42. Ill. Brick Co., 720 U.S. at 746–47. The Court acknowledged that recoveries in antitrust suits
“often have failed to compensate the individuals on behalf of whom the suits have been brought,” id. at
747 n.31, and that Congress “recognize[d] that rarely, if ever, will all potential claimants actually come
forward to secure their share of the recovery.” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-499, at 16 (1975)).
Justice Brennan’s dissent also took aim at a second functional objective—avoidance of complexity
in damages calculations and fear of duplicative recovery. Brennan rejected the majority’s assertion that
avoiding complexity was, in itself, a reason to reject pass-on in all cases, noting that “[d]ifficulty of
ascertainment is no longer confused with right of recovery,” id. at 756 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265–66 (1946)), and that “[r]easoned estimation is
required in all antitrust cases,” id. at 759.
Brennan also attacked the majority’s affection for symmetry. He argued that “[d]espite the
superficial appeal of the argument that Hanover Shoe should be applied ‘consistently’ . . . there are
sound reasons for treating offensive and defensive passing-on cases differently,” and that Hanover Shoe
“certainly did not imply that an indirect purchaser would not also have [standing].” Id. at 753. He
charged the majority with mischaracterizing the Hanover Shoe ruling, which he viewed as having
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C. A DIVIDED COURT AND A PER SE RULE
As much as consistency with Hanover Shoe was a motivation behind
the Illinois Brick outcome, it was also a great source of disagreement. In a
separate dissent, Justice Blackmun lamented “an unhappy chronology” that
bound Illinois Brick to Hanover Shoe, musing that “[i]f [Hanover Shoe]
had not preceded this case . . . I am positive that the Court today would
[grant standing].” 43
Recent scholarship on Illinois Brick suggests that Justice Blackmun
was correct. 44 An examination of the archives of Justices Blackmun and
Powell revealed that when the Justices first discussed Illinois Brick at
conference, six Justices were in favor of granting standing to indirect
purchasers, and only after intense lobbying by Justice White did he obtain a
six-vote majority. 45 The papers reveal that the swing Justices were
motivated by stare decisis, remaining consistent with Hanover Shoe, and by
a desire to apply standing rules “even-handed[ly]” to both plaintiffs and
defendants. 46 These two concerns were reflected in the structure of the
majority opinion itself, which cast the issue, first, as whether to apply the
rule equally to plaintiffs and defendants and, second, whether to uphold
Hanover Shoe. 47 Indeed, the outcome’s sensitivity to chronology extends to
other antitrust standing cases as well. Roger Blair and Jeffrey Harrison
have argued that Illinois Brick would have been unnecessary had it
followed, rather than preceded, antitrust cases in which the Supreme Court
just a few years later established other rules of antitrust standing. 48
evaluated a choice between “overcompensat[ing] the plaintiff, . . . or . . . allowing [the violator] to retain
a portion of his ill-gotten overcharges” and opting to risk overcompensation. Id. at 752.
43. Id. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
44. See Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy Wars Episode I: Illinois Brick from Inside the
Supreme Court, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 553, 576–605 (2005).
45. Id. at 596–97. The six justices who initially favored granting standing included Justices
Burger, Brennan, Blackmun, Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, with Justices Rehnquist, White and possibly
Marshall opposing standing. Id. at 596. Justice White’s lobbying won the votes of Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, with Justice Marshall switching sides to oppose White. Id. at
597.
46. Id. at 601–02 & n.284 (arguing that Justice Powell was swayed in part by Justice Rehnquist’s
argument that plaintiffs and defendants be “treated in an even-handed manner”).
47. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 723–29.
48. Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern
Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 42 (1999) (calling the Illinois Brick decision
“obsolete”). For a discussion of the leading cases, see infra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
Similarly, some commentators speculate that if Illinois Brick had preceded Hanover Shoe and come out
differently, then Hanover Shoe itself might also have come out differently. See, e.g., AMC REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, at 438 (separate statement of Commissioner Donald G. Kempf, Jr.).
Indeed, if the Court could have pointed to a firmly established possibility of subsequent indirect
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The Supreme Court’s actions in subsequent cases were also quite
important (and have not been adequately recognized) in shaping the nature
of the current indirect purchaser rule. The Court for some time appeared
uncommitted to the indirect purchaser rule, and the Court’s fissures
exposed in Illinois Brick played out in subsequent cases. Just five years
after Illinois Brick, the Court placed limits on the reach of the indirect
purchaser rule in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready and granted standing
to an indirectly injured HMO plan-holder. 49 In McCready, an HMO
refused to reimburse a patient for mental health services that were provided
by a psychologist rather than a psychiatrist. The patient sued, alleging that
the HMO policy was a product of an illegal conspiracy among
psychiatrists. The Court permitted the patient’s action against the
psychiatrists to move forward even though the patient had contracted only
with (and was denied payment by) her HMO. 50
The 5-4 opinion revealed the fault lines and the Court’s lack of
confidence in the indirect purchaser rule. The majority opinion was
authored by Justice Brennan and was joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun (the other two Illinois Brick dissenters), Justice Powell (a swing
vote in Illinois Brick) and Justice White (the author of Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick). The fragile majority refused to administer an inflexible
application of Illinois Brick and instead carefully recast that precedent in
functional terms, declaring that it was designed primarily to avoid
duplicative recovery. 51 Because there was no risk of duplicative recovery
in McCready’s case (there was no threat that the direct purchaser—the
HMO—would seek its own redress), the Court held that Illinois Brick did
not bar recovery. 52 Indeed, Justice Brennan emphasized that the private
cause of action created by section 4 of the Clayton Act has “broad remedial
and deterrent objectives” and, therefore, standing should be presumed
absent a “statutory policy suggesting a contrary conclusion in a particular
factual setting . . . .” 53
This limitation of Illinois Brick, however, was short-lived. Eight years
purchaser suits, it might not have been as concerned with the antideterrent effect of a pass-on defense.
49. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 485 (1982).
50. Id.
51. See id. at 474 (noting that the Illinois Brick Court “found unacceptable the risk of duplicative
recovery . . .”).
52. Id. at 474–75.
53. Id. at 473. The Court goes on to address the question of multiple liability by noting that
although the Illinois Brick Court “found unacceptable the risk of duplicative recovery,” there was no
such risk here because the psychologists, having been paid by McCready, could never recover from the
HMO. Id. at 474–75.
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later a new 5-4 majority replaced the tempered, functionally-oriented rule
in McCready with a much more restrictive and inflexible rule in Kansas v.
UtiliCorp United Inc. 54 The UtiliCorp majority, which consisted of all the
remaining McCready dissenters (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens and O’Connor), plus the Court’s two newcomers (Justices Scalia
and Kennedy), denied standing to consumers who paid inflated prices for
natural gas through an intermediary public utility. 55 Even though the utility
passed on the overcharge from natural gas suppliers to consumers pursuant
to a fixed markup that was set by regulators, the Supreme Court refused to
apply the cost-plus contract exception that was explicit in both Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick. 56 The Court reasoned that the utility suffered a
“potential injury” since the suppliers’ overcharge may have prevented the
utility from receiving a rate increase based on factors other than supply
costs, and calculating an apportionment of that injury to “indirect
purchasers” would introduce “the very complexity that Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick sought to avoid.” 57 The dissent, written by Justice White and
joined by the dwindling McCready majority (Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
and Marshall), disagreed that the injury calculations involved significant
complexity or any risk of multiple liability. 58 Distinguishing the
competitive and uncertain concrete block market in Illinois Brick from a
“highly regulated market where utilities possess[] natural monopolies” in
UtiliCorp, 59 the dissenters argued that “[n]one of the concerns that caused
us to bar the indirect purchaser’s suit in Illinois Brick exist in this case.” 60
Justice White closed his dissent lamenting that the majority’s “rigid and
expansive holding” misinterpreted his Illinois Brick opinion and did
nothing to “promote the twin antitrust goals of ensuring recompense for
injured parties and encouraging the diligent prosecution of antitrust
claims.” 61
Justice White’s characterization of the Court’s holding as “rigid and
expansive” has proven to be correct. Even though the majority disparaged a
flexible approach for the possibility that it could lead to difficult
calculations, its ruling did not rest on a degree of anticipated complexity.
To the contrary, UtiliCorp affirmatively enshrined the indirect purchaser
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
Id. at 204, 219.
Id. at 209–10.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 223–24 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 220.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 225–26.

2007]

REBUILDING ILLINOIS BRICK

81

rule as a categorical bright-line rule that is immune to functionally
motivated recalibrations. The UtiliCorp Court was resolute in putting an
end to quibbling over the contours of the rule: “[E]ven assuming that any
economic assumptions underlying the . . . rule might be disproved in a
specific case, we think it an unwarranted and counterproductive exercise to
litigate a series of exceptions.” 62 The Court has not spoken since on the
indirect purchaser rule, leaving this categorical version as current law.
The unqualified nature of the current indirect purchaser rule places it
at odds with the general body of current antitrust law. Modern antitrust,
reflecting the influence of the so-called Chicago School, eschews inflexible
formalist rulings that rest on categorical distinctions and instead favors a
functionalist approach designed to maximize social welfare. 63 As economic
understanding and awareness of market conditions have improved, and as
alternative scenarios arise within different market conditions, courts have
adapted antitrust law to account for and adjust to the different applications.
This trend has eliminated many per se rules in favor of evaluative rules of
reason, and has shifted away from adherence to legal category and stare
decisis and instead explicitly pursues functional objectives. 64
Not only is the formalism of the post-UtiliCorp indirect purchaser rule
at odds with the trend and purpose of antitrust law generally, but it is also
an outlier from other rules that determine antitrust standing, all of which
rest heavily on welfarist considerations. In Associated General Contractors
62. Id. at 217 (majority opinion).
63. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91 (1978)
(“The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without
impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer
welfare.”).
64. As the Supreme Court explained in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
50 n.16 (1977),
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of
particular commercial practices. The probability that anticompetitive consequences will result
from a practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced against its procompetitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se rule
reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the
time and expense necessary to identify them. Once established, per se rules tend to provide
guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial
system of the more complex rule-of-reason trials, see Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5; United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609–10 (1972), but those
advantages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se rules. If it were
otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules, thus introducing an
unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law.
The trend continued last spring in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2705, 2725 (2007), which overturned the longstanding rule that vertical price agreements were per se
illegal. The Court stated that “departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon
demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.” Id. at 2713 (quoting
Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 58–59).
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of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, the Court
denied standing to a labor union seeking recovery from a trade association
that had allegedly coerced third parties to deal with nonunion suppliers. 65
In rejecting a literal interpretation of standing under the Clayton Act, the
Court adopted a functionalist approach that looked to a host of factors such
as the nature of the injury, the causal relationship between the violation and
the injury, the directness or indirectness of the injury, whether the plaintiff
is of a class of economic actors that Congress meant to protect, and
whether denying recovery to a given class of plaintiffs is likely to result in
underdetection of violations. 66 Similarly, in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., the Court cited functional considerations to deny
standing to a plaintiff who challenged a proposed merger that would
prevent a competitor from going bankrupt. 67 The Court acknowledged that
the merger might violate antitrust laws, but denied standing because the
type of harm—decreased profits from increased competition—was
“inimical to the purposes” of antitrust law. 68 The categorical nature of the
indirect purchaser rule is in tension with these other rules of standing that,
like the rest of modern antitrust law, are both flexibly constructed and
applied with an eye toward the ultimate objectives behind the law. 69
In sum, the survival and contours of the Illinois Brick rule can only be
described as surprising. Creation of the rule depended on a particular
chronology, in which four swing justices were convinced to adhere to an
65. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
520–22 (1983) (describing a “multiemployer collective bargaining agreement” whose participants were
alleged to have encouraged members and third parties not to deal with labor unions, including plaintiff).
66. Id. at 536–42 (emphasizing that no single factor is dispositive and that, in this area, it is
“virtually impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case”).
67. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 484–88 (1977) (describing
plaintiff’s alleged damage as that profit it would have gained had its smaller local competitors gone
bankrupt, rather than having been acquired by the defendant).
68. Id. at 488. The Court emphasized the required nexus between the harm sought to be avoided
and the activity at issue. Id. at 484–89.
69. Some lower courts have resisted the categorical nature of the indirect purchaser rule,
avoiding its rigid application and instead applying the functionalist approach in Associated General
Contractors and other private enforcement standing cases. For example, in Loeb Industries, Inc. v.
Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit permitted purchasers of copper to
bring suit against parties who illegally conspired to fix prices in the copper futures market. Even though
the defendants did not sell copper, and thus the plaintiffs were not direct purchasers, the conspiracy
inflated copper prices and directly harmed the plaintiffs. Id. at 477, 480–81. To preempt the floodgates
of claims from other users of copper, the court applied the Associated General Contractors remoteness
test, see supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text, to distinguish between directly harmed copper
buyers and more remotely injured parties, Sumitomo, 306 F.3d at 484–95. Sumitomo—a situation in
which there were no direct purchasers—illustrates both the limits of the Illinois Brick categorical
approach and the utility of antitrust’s more functional standing rules.
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earlier ruling. It has persisted through two conflicting 5-4 decisions that
articulate very different approaches to antitrust standing. Yet despite this
ambivalent past and shaky foundation, we are left with an inflexible and
sweeping categorical rule that is in tension with the tenor of modern
antitrust law. With this background, it is no surprise that even though the
doctrine’s critics inside the Court were relegated to the minority, critics
outside the Court have remained vocal and resolute, doggedly reciting the
rule’s many significant shortcomings and determinedly assembling a
legitimate case for reform.
D. LIMITED DEBATE AND LIMITED OPTIONS
The fierce debate between commentators has mirrored the sharp
divisions on the Court. Opposition to Illinois Brick was so great and so
immediate that, just months after the decision, Congress began considering
proposals to overturn that decision. 70 Initial efforts at legislative reform
failed, however, and dissatisfaction with the indirect purchaser rule
translated instead into periodic efforts by assorted interest groups to prompt
policymakers to review and reevaluate antitrust rules of standing. Many
such reevaluations have taken place over the past thirty years, but the
history is marked by few innovative proposals and instead has housed a
repetitious and dichotomous debate.
Early congressional interest in repealing Illinois Brick prompted the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) to constitute a task force in 1978 to
evaluate legislative alternatives. 71 Internal disagreements within the task
force led to separate majority and minority reports, forecasting a deep and
enduring split over how best to handle the indirect purchaser problem. 72
The 1978 task force report is nonetheless a thoughtful contribution. Though
the majority and minority took different routes, both grounded their
proposals on functional concerns for deterrence, compensation, and,
primarily, avoidance of complexity in calculating pass-on damages. 73 The
majority believed that measuring pass-on damages would be impossible,
and suggested mandatory consolidation of actions in a single forum—
70. See Josef D. Cooper & David L. Foster, Report of the American Bar Association Antitrust
Law Section Task Force on Legislative Alternatives Concerning Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 46
ANTITRUST L.J. 1137, 1141–42 (1978).
71. See id. at 1141 (“[T]he Task Force did not assess the desirability of a legislative
reversal . . . but rather proceeded on the assumption that such legislation . . . would be passed.”).
72. See id. at 1156–57, 1171.
73. See id. at 1144–45, 1164–70.
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including an “opt-in” requirement—to prevent multiple liability. 74 The
minority argued instead that greater participation should come under the
traditional class action rule, which provides only for opting out of the
class. 75
This debate surrounding the first foray into legislative reform seemed
promising in that the ABA reports looked past repeal and toward different
functional approaches, but the failure of the early attempts to repeal Illinois
Brick quickly hobbled the debate. Reform efforts were rekindled in 1983,
but already the movement had lost its luster. Unlike the early efforts, the
1983 debate did not engage the principal question of how to craft indirect
purchaser standing. Instead, it took a much narrower scope, contemplating
a limited repeal of Illinois Brick that would allow indirect purchaser suits to
be brought exclusively by state attorneys general on a parens patriae
theory. 76 That proposal was vigorously criticized by a second ABA task
force largely because it failed to address the functional and complexity
concerns raised by Illinois Brick. 77
At around the same time, academic commentators weighed in on
Illinois Brick. William Landes and Richard Posner defended the Illinois
Brick doctrine in a 1979 article that argued that vesting standing in direct
purchasers alone would improve the enforcement of antitrust laws. 78
Landes and Posner reasoned that because direct purchasers had more
contact with antitrust violators, they had better information than indirect
purchasers; thus, they were more likely to discover antitrust violations,
would encounter fewer costs in detecting and alleging violations, and
would therefore serve as more accurate and less costly private policemen. 79
74. Id. at 1144, 1148–49. The minority generally agreed, but would have expanded the
consolidation mechanism to include antitrust generally, rather than just to indirect purchaser actions, as
the majority had proposed. Id. at 1159.
75. Compare id. at 1151–52 (emphasizing the efficiency from the preclusive effect of an
exclusive opt-in procedure), with id. at 1164–67 (voicing concern that, because many indirect
purchasers lack sophistication and suffer little harm, an opt-in requirement would operate as a “trojan
horse” that would keep the class of plaintiffs small).
76. Richard G. Schneider et al., Legislative Issues and Judicial Developments: Report of the
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review Proposed Legislation to
Repeal or Modify Illinois Brick, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 849–52 (1983).
77. Id. at 841.
78. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue
Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602,
634–35 (1979).
79. Id. at 609 (“The remote purchaser may not know that a price increase to him is attributable to
a price increase by a remote supplier, and even if he does know, he will find it difficult to discover the
reasons for the remote supplier’s price increase.”). Landes and Posner further argue that indirect
purchasers are still as fully compensated under Illinois Brick because they additionally receive the
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Other commentators disagreed. Robert Harris and Lawrence Sullivan,
writing that same year, argued that direct purchasers would pass on most
overcharges to subsequent buyers and thus would have little reason to
pursue violators. 80 Indeed, rather than race to uncover violations, direct
purchasers would be reluctant to disrupt important supplier relationships,
and thus would be far less reliable policemen than indirect purchasers. 81
Such dichotomous arguments—the debate over whether direct
purchasers would enforce the antitrust laws better, or worse, than indirect
purchasers—became the paradigmatic arguments for subsequent discussion
over the indirect purchaser rule. Commentators and interest groups became
increasingly split on this threshold question, and the early debates set the
archetypical arguments for and against the indirect purchaser rule. Just as
each camp began to dig in, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court took a hard
line in UtiliCorp, rejecting a broader discussion of functional
considerations in favor of a rigid per se rule. The Court’s decision
eliminated the possibility of an evolving indirect purchaser rule and, as a
result, the academic debate congealed around—and remained stuck at—a
binary policy choice of whether or not to repeal both Illinois Brick and
Hanover Shoe.
In spite of the failure at the national level to reform Illinois Brick, the
political backlash against the decision was widespread and quite effective
in prompting responses in state legislatures. Opposition to Illinois Brick
convinced several states to grant indirect purchasers a cause of action to
enforce state competition laws. 82 These so-called “Illinois Brick repealer
benefits from any recovery by an antitrust suit brought by direct purchasers since the recovery from any
such suit would be factored into the prices a direct purchaser charges. Id. at 605. Critics have called this
argument “quite implausible.” Gregory J. Werden & Marius Schwartz, Illinois Brick and the
Deterrence of Antitrust Violations—An Economic Analysis, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 629, 638 (1984)
(asserting, in conjunction with fellow commentators, that “Illinois Brick runs counter to the goal of
compensation”).
80. Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A
Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 351–52 (1979).
81. Landes and Posner responded directly to this point by arguing that “any forbearance by the
direct purchaser to sue will be compensated. The supplier must pay something to bind the direct
purchaser to him and this payment is, functionally, a form of antitrust damages.” William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
1274, 1278 (1980). For an analysis that Illinois Brick enhanced deterrence primarily by reducing
litigations costs, see Werden & Schwartz, supra note 79, at 652–53, 667.
82. For an overview of the legislative response to Illinois Brick at the federal and state levels, see
Cavanagh, supra note 6, at 23–29. For a detailed description of the so-called state repealers, see Daniel
R. Karon, “Your Honor, Tear Down that Illinois Brick Wall!” The National Movement Toward Indirect
Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1351 (2004).
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statutes,” 83 in addition to enabling parallel litigation in state and federal
courts (and thus creating a tremendous degree of litigation complexity), 84
also introduced an additional formal dimension to the debate. In 1989, the
Supreme Court in California v. ARC America Corp. upheld indirect
purchaser recovery under these state repealer statutes, ruling that they were
not preempted by federal antitrust law. 85 This prompted a second question
in the Illinois Brick debate over whether Congress should supercede the
state rules and establish a national standard.
The debate over indirect purchaser standing thus evolved, though only
slightly, into two inquiries: whether to repeal Illinois Brick and whether to
preempt state repealer statutes. But the legal formality of these questions
belied the growing procedural complexity of multijurisdictional and
parallel litigation produced from state indirect purchaser actions, which
began to impose severe administrative costs under the still-unreformed
rule. 86 One year after ARC America, another ABA task force returned to
the question of indirect purchaser standing to evaluate the implications of
the repealer statutes. 87 This report, however, swept through the familiar
terrain and summarized what was by then conventional wisdom. The task
force report reiterated the well-known deficiencies of the Illinois Brick
rule—increased litigation complexity, heightened risk of multiple liability,
and the omnipresent complexity in calculating pass-on injury—and how
those problems were exacerbated by the advent of state indirect purchaser
actions. 88 The task force then outlined an overview of potential reforms,
including retaining the status quo, preempting state actions, and allowing
federal indirect purchaser actions. 89 Thus, the 1990 task force report
interpreted the rise of repealer statutes to merely offer one additional
reform possibility—whether federal law should perhaps preempt state
law—rather than as evidence that the Illinois Brick rule was not working or
as an opportunity to revisit the complex problem of indirect purchaser
standing.
83. Id. at 1371.
84. See infra Part III.C.
85. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105–06 (1989) (“The congressional purposes on
which Illinois Brick was based provide no support for a finding that state indirect purchaser statutes are
preempted by federal law.”).
86. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 6, at 30–31.
87. Michael F. Brockmeyer et al., ARC America Task Force Report: Report of the American Bar
Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the Supreme Court’s Decision in California
v. ARC America Corp., 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 273–74 (1990).
88. Id. at 282–83.
89. Id. at 288–304. The task force also discussed the possibility of attempting to harmonize state
repealer statutes to create a uniform standard. Id. at 296–97.
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The latest iteration of the debate is the Antitrust Modernization
Commission’s recent report to Congress. 90 The AMC was charged with
proposing reforms to antitrust laws generally, but it devoted a significant
share of its time and resources to the problem of indirect purchaser
standing. 91 Unfortunately, rather than encouraging an innovative and
overarching approach to the indirect purchaser rule, the views aired at the
AMC’s hearings largely rehashed the well-worn arguments in the thirtyyear-old debate. Plaintiff attorneys and others favoring repeal of Illinois
Brick continued to argue along the same lines as Harris and Sullivan:
federal indirect purchaser actions would improve the effectiveness of
federal antitrust laws and policy and, to the extent plaintiffs would prefer to
litigate in a federal forum, availability of a federal cause of action would
largely obviate the need to preempt state laws. 92 Defense attorneys and
other panelists in favor of the current regime argued along the lines Posner
and Landes first sketched out: that deterrence would suffer if potential
direct purchaser recovery were reduced. 93 To address the problem of state
indirect purchaser actions, the proposals echoed those offered just after the
ARC America decision nearly two decades earlier, ranging from outright
preemption of state repealers to allowing indirect purchaser actions only by
state attorneys general. 94 But the threshold matter throughout the AMC’s
deliberations focused on the familiar dichotomous question of whether or
not to keep the current indirect purchaser rule, with procedural innovations
90. AMC REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5.
91. See id. at 265–78. Indeed, Illinois Brick was at the top of a list of topics proposed to the
AMC by the ABA. See Richard J. Wallis, Report of the Section of Antitrust Law of the ABA to the
AMC, 2004 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. REP. 2, available at http://www.amc.gov/comments/abaantitrust
sec.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2007). The proposed reforms in this area are among the most substantial
recommendations in the AMC’s report. See AMC REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, at
18.
92. See discussion infra Part III.B. Compare ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N,
TRANSCRIPT OF INDIRECT PURCHASER HEARINGS 107–10, 168–69 (2005), available at
http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/pdf/050627_Indirect_Purchaser_Transcript_reform.pdf
[hereinafter TRANSCRIPT OF INDIRECT PURCHASER HEARINGS] (statements of Michael L. Denger,
Senior Antitrust Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP and Andrew I. Gavil, Professor of Law,
Howard University Law School) (asserting that most overcharges are passed on, limiting incentives for
direct purchasers to sue), with Harris & Sullivan, supra note 80, at 290–94 (arguing that in the long run
all overcharges are passed on). The modern commentators were also able to cite anecdotally cases
where direct purchasers were slow to bring claims despite recoverable injury under Hanover Shoe.
TRANSCRIPT OF INDIRECT PURCHASER HEARINGS, supra, at 17–18, 24–25 (statements of H. Laddie
Montague, Jr., Chairman of Antitrust Dep’t, Berger & Montague, P.C. and Mark J. Bennett, Att’y Gen.
of Hawaii).
93. TRANSCRIPT OF INDIRECT PURCHASER HEARINGS, supra note 92, at 18 (statement of H.
Laddie Montague, Jr., Chairman of Antitrust Dep’t, Berger & Montague, P.C.).
94. AMC REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, at 4 (reviewing discarded alternatives
to preemption).
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relegated to secondary consideration.
Ultimately, the AMC’s proposals fell safely within the bounds of
previously articulated reform efforts. The Commission recommended
overruling Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe in order to allow indirect
purchaser recovery and to prevent multiple liability. 95 Further, the
Commission recommended removal, consolidation, and class certification
mechanisms to encourage actions arising from the same violation to be
litigated in the same forum. 96 Not surprisingly, the AMC proposals were
immediately greeted by the same criticisms leveled at previous reform
efforts. The American Antitrust Institute, for example, warned in its public
comments on the AMC proposal that the AMC’s recommendation to repeal
Hanover Shoe would “eviscerate” antitrust deterrence by reducing direct
purchaser recoveries. 97 This reflects the common perception that
strengthening the hands of indirect purchasers necessarily weakens the
hands of direct purchasers.
Congress is now considering the AMC’s proposal, and it is unclear
how much traction, if any, the recommendations will have. The camps both
favoring and opposing the Illinois Brick doctrine are, and always have
been, well-organized, and the prospects of reform are uncertain at best. The
predictable debate does, however, offer Congress a useful opportunity to
entertain new proposals, which have been surprisingly lacking despite the
issue’s importance and the attention it has received. The time is ripe for a
renewed approach to the problem that reflects the foundational objectives
of antitrust and offers creative additions to the menu of available policy
95. Id. at 267.
96. Id. The AMC’s recommendation to repeal Illinois Brick was not, however, a foregone
conclusion: there was substantial disagreement among the commissioners, with several writing separate
commentary explaining their positions. The final votes in the AMC on whether to repeal Illinois Brick
and Hanover Shoe was 12 to 3, with several more suggesting their view was driven not by concern for
indirect purchasers, but rather the logistical problems posed by state indirect purchase recovery statutes.
See id. at 266.
97. See WORKING GROUP ON CIVIL REMEDIES, AMERICAN ANTITRUST INST., COMMENTS TO THE
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION BY THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S WORKING
GROUP ON CIVIL REMEDIES CONCERNING THE AMC’S PROPOSAL REGARDING DIRECT & INDIRECT
PURCHASER ACTIONS 3 (2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/amc071.ashx.
The American Antitrust Institute supports indirect purchaser recovery in theory, but it disapproves of
the AMC’s flat reversal of Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe. See Letter from Albert A. Foer, President,
American Antitrust Inst., to the Honorable Patrick J. Leahey, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm. et al.
3 (Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/amc072.ashx (“We praise the
AMC for urging this expansion of the Illinois Brick repealer principle . . . however, it appears to us that
under the AMC proposal, this theoretical expansion will be much more than offset by the decimation of
the direct purchaser recovery, with the result that there will be less deterrence . . . .”).
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options. 98
III. FUNCTIONAL OBJECTIVES AND DYSFUNCTIONAL
OUTCOMES OF THE INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE
As the indirect purchaser rule has drifted from a pragmatic and
functionally responsive doctrine to an inflexible and categorical decree, it
has proven increasingly inadequate in facilitating private enforcement of
the antitrust laws. This inadequacy is measured by the doctrine’s failure to
advance three key functional objectives of antitrust law: compensation,
deterrence, and economical litigation. Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick
were meant to squarely address the latter two and explicitly jettisoned the
first, but the doctrine has failed to advance even the functional objectives it
was designed to achieve. The doctrine instead has been criticized for
preventing, not promoting, antitrust enforcement, and the growth of
indirect purchaser actions in state court has spawned parallel litigation that
has created more, not less, complexity. A good part of these undesirable
consequences—and the general failure of the Illinois Brick doctrine—can
be attributed to the growth of multiparty supply chains that are now a
mainstay of globalized commerce. Standing rules should therefore be
reconstituted according to both the structural realities of the global
marketplace and the enduring functional objectives of antitrust.
98. Europe is also struggling over indirect purchaser standing, but the debate is still in its
infancy. A 2004 comparative study of European competition law, in which antitrust experts in each
European country were surveyed regarding private antitrust enforcement in their home country,
reported that almost no cases had addressed either the standing of indirect purchasers or the availability
of a pass-on defense. See DENIS WAELBROECK, DONALD SLATER & GIL EVEN-SHOSHAN, STUDY ON
THE CONDITIONS OF CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES IN CASE OF INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION RULES
77–79 (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/
comparative_report_clean_en.pdf. The closest parallel to the political wrangling in the United States
was a failed legislative proposal in Germany that would have enacted a rule against the pass-on defense.
Id. at 79. Interestingly, those experts generally concluded both that a pass-on defense was appropriate
(as long as the burden of proof fell on the defendant) and that indirect purchasers should have standing
to sue (as long as they could establish causation). Id. at 111.
The debate in Europe, however, is likely to pick up steam as the European Commission is
increasingly seeking mechanisms to encourage private enforcement of its competition laws. In
December 2005, the European Commission published a “Green Paper” designed to improve and
facilitate private enforcement of EC competition law, and it identified the pass-on defense and indirect
purchaser standing as important issues to address. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., GREEN
PAPER: DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF THE EC ANTITRUST RULES 3, 7–8 (2005), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0672en01.pdf.
One
European
commentator has declared the problem of passing-on in indirect purchaser actions to be “probably the
central problem of private antitrust enforcement.” Friedrich Wenzel Bulst, Private Antitrust
Enforcement at a Roundabout, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 725, 732 (2006) (emphasis in original).
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A. ABANDONING COMPENSATION
At the heart of the debate between the majority and dissent in Illinois
Brick was the primacy of deterrence over compensation. The dissent
objected to a rule that gave no recourse to injured parties, while the
majority persisted that standing rules must incentivize direct purchasers to
enforce the antitrust laws. 99 But this debate was structured by the
perception that Hanover Shoe caused these objectives to be irreconcilable,
with the majority concluding that deterrence trumped the otherwise
admirable goal of compensation. 100 In fact, denying standing to injured
parties is in plain conflict with the intended effect of the Clayton Act, and
the Supreme Court’s preference for deterrence does not eliminate the
importance of compensation. Despite the doctrine’s ossification into an
absolute rule that precludes the possibility of either optimizing the
compensation-deterrence trade-off or balancing them on a case-by-case
basis, compensation remains a desirable objective.
As a threshold matter, there is little doubt that compensation of injured
parties is both an express congressional motivation underlying private
antitrust enforcement and a valid functional objective of antitrust. In
enacting the Clayton Act, Congress articulated its intention to ensure
“justice to every man . . . and giv[e] the injured party ample damages for
the wrong suffered.” 101 Such a commitment to compensation certainly is
consistent with normative approaches to the law. Corrective justice theories
emphasize the role that liability plays in rectifying the injustice that one
party imposes on another and affirm that compensation to injured parties is
central to remedying the injustice. 102 Further, even the earliest utilitarian
theories of law view compensation of injured parties as a form of social
insurance that increases every individual’s expected utility, regardless of ex
ante risk. 103
99. Compare Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 749 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stressing compensation as a functional objective), with id. at 745 (majority opinion) (emphasizing the
need to decrease costs and concentrate benefits of bringing a treble-damages action to facilitate antitrust
enforcement).
100. See id. at 746–47.
101. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977) (“The
initial House debates concerning provisions related to private damages actions reveal that these actions
were conceived primarily as ‘open[ing] the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured
by those who violate the antitrust laws, and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for the wrong
suffered.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb)).
102. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 317–18 (1992). Corrective justice theory
finds its origins in Aristotle’s writings. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 116–25 (Hugh
Tredennick ed., J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books 2004) (1953).
103. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94–96 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
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By granting standing only to direct purchasers, the Illinois Brick
doctrine is in clear tension with these principles. First, precluding recourse
to indirect purchasers means that justice is not delivered “to every man,”
and as the dissent in Illinois Brick observed, direct purchasers’ ability to
pass on illegal overcharges means that the ultimate harm falls only on the
parties who have no recourse, whereas compensation goes to parties who
experience little or no harm. 104 Thus, the doctrine causes antitrust to
provide social insurance to the wrong party, such that even when antitrust
violators are appropriately punished, damages are allocated contrary to
what the social optimum would dictate. 105
This was all known by the Illinois Brick majority, and the Court struck
a calculated bargain by trading compensation for deterrence. But that
bargain might be unraveling as the economy tends toward increasingly
complex, decentralized, and international supply relationships. The
problem that the Court encountered, and the problem that complicates
simultaneous pursuit of compensation and deterrence, is the rise of the
multilayered supply chain. There is little tension between the two
objectives in a two-party producer-consumer transaction, in which the party
that purchases directly from an antitrust violator is also the consumer—in
this simplistic setting (and only in this setting) the direct purchaser is the
ultimate victim of an illegal overcharge. But this two-party model is
becoming increasingly uncommon. 106 The decision in Illinois Brick to
sacrifice compensation for deterrence would be more justifiable if such a
sacrifice were only occasional, but as multilevel supply chains become
more the rule than the exception—and the exposure of indirect purchasers
to passed-on antitrust injury grows accordingly—the indirect purchaser rule
increasingly operates to undermine compensation.
It is not clear that the Illinois Brick Court knew how categorically it
was denying compensation to injured parties, but the permanence of
multilayered supply chains—coupled with the enduring importance of
Harvard Univ. Press 1967) (1881). For a more contemporary utilitarian approach in tort law, see
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987);
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
104. See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Landes and Posner suggest that indirect purchasers receive equivalent compensation from
antitrust violators since the gains from direct purchasers who bring victorious suits are passed down,
just as overcharges are passed down, see Landes & Posner, supra note 78, but this argument has been
called “quite implausible,” see Werden & Schwartz, supra note 79, at 638.
106. See, e.g., COMMODITY CHAINS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM (Gary Gereffi & Miguel
Korzeniewicz eds., 1994) (illustrating the rise of global commodity chains and the spread of multilevel,
international production networks); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2d ed. 2006).
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compensation as a policy objective—demands pursuit of standing rules that
do more to compensate the injured. Equally significant, the debate within
the Illinois Brick opinion can be interpreted as an agreement that both
compensating victims and deterring violations are core objectives for
antitrust law; thus, the dispute between the majority and dissent is obviated
if standing rules pursue both compensation and deterrence. A
comprehensive approach to reforming standing rules offers that possibility.
B. INADEQUATE DETERRENCE
The indirect purchaser rule’s abandonment of compensation in favor
of deterrence might be more palatable if it, in fact, enhanced deterrence.
Unfortunately, the converse appears to be true, and antitrust violators
currently appear to be underdeterred.
The Illinois Brick Court appropriately recognized deterrence as a key
functional objective of private enforcement and an express purpose of the
Clayton Act. The Act’s provisions creating private causes of action
underscore the congressional view that both private and government
actions are needed to adequately police antitrust violators. 107 Moreover, the
Clayton Act’s adoption of a treble damages remedy is designed to go
beyond mere compensation and to enhance the deterrent and punitive effect
of private enforcement. 108 Not surprisingly, deterrence through private
107. For a discussion of the legislative history of the private enforcement provision of the Clayton
Act, see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977) (“The House
debates following the conference committee report . . . indicate that the sponsors of the bill also saw
treble-damages suits as an important means of enforcing the law.” (citing 51 CONG. REC. 16274–75
(statement of Rep. Webb), 16317–19 (statement of Rep. Floyd))). The documents referenced in
Brunswick can be found in 2–3 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND
RELATED STATUTES (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978).
108. See sources cited supra note 107. Others have viewed treble damages as an attempt to
approximate an optimal sanction. See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 653 (1983). Landes proposes that an optimal fine for an antitrust violation
would be the economic harm resulting from that antitrust violation divided by the probability of the
violator being held accountable. Id. at 657. Modeled from tort theory, the formula intends to force the
violator to internalize the societal costs of the antitrust violation, with the trebling of damages
compensating for the uncertain probability that the violation will be detected. Id. at 676. Landes
suggests that this would mean that violations would only occur when the efficiency gains of the conduct
outweigh the now-internalized cost to society. Id. at 653. One problem with this approach, however, is
it neglects that antitrust law is supposed to punish only socially undesirable, that is, welfare-reducing,
conduct. Thus, if substantive antitrust law was properly applied, violations would be limited to conduct
that reduces total surplus, and “efficient violations” would not be violations at all. Perhaps, from a
functional perspective, overdeterrence (that is, deterring socially desirable conduct) is impossible,
except to the extent that excessive fines for violations may increase bankruptcy risk and its attendant
social costs. But if there is a cost to administering or imposing high fines, and there otherwise is a
reason to make fines as low as possible while still deterring all potential violations, then the Landes
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enforcement fits well with normative theories of tort that emphasize
punishment of wrongdoing. 109 As a functional matter, empowering private
actors, who enjoy certain informational advantages and often bring greater
numbers and resources than public law enforcement can alone, enhances
the likelihood of detecting violations. 110
The initial debate over how effectively Illinois Brick would facilitate
private antitrust enforcement included sharply contrasting views. Early
ABA task forces included both those who heralded direct purchasers as the
primary engines for antitrust enforcement and those who thought indirect
purchasers were required for effective enforcement. 111 Academic
commentators who weighed in also represented both views, with Landes
and Posner offering arguments that squarely contrasted those of Harris and
Sullivan. 112 But most of this early debate rested on theoretical and untested
assertions. Proponents of the rule reasoned that direct purchasers had
superior information and incentives, and thus were more likely to discover
formula makes sense.
109. Private enforcement was a critical element of Aristotle’s conception of rectificatory or
corrective justice. ARISTOTLE, supra note 102, at bk. V, ch. 4. For corrective justice theorists who
embrace the Aristotelian approach for role of private enforcement in tort law, see Jules L. Coleman, The
Morality of Strict Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259 (1976); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law:
Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979); George P. Fletcher,
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). For a summary of contemporary
corrective justice theories, see Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV.
449, 449–50 (1992) (outlining “annulment” and “obligation of reparation” theories of corrective
justice).
110. The informational advantage enjoyed by private actors relates to Friedrich Hayek’s famous
championing of market mechanisms, in which individuals utilize their decentralized knowledge through
spontaneous action. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945). Many contemporary economists employ this same logic. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 578–79 (2004) (observing that the optimal structure of
law relies, in large part, on private enforcement due to informational advantages enjoyed by private
parties). In practice, this rationale is mitigated somewhat since many private antitrust enforcement
actions emerge not from private discovery of an antitrust violation but instead follow a public
investigation and criminal prosecution for the same conduct. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the
Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L.
REV. 215, 222 n.16 (1983) (describing a “legion” of “tag-along” private antitrust actions which
followed government prosecutions); Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on
Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (noting that “[t]he chance of successful private litigation rises dramatically
when government litigation paves the way”).
An equally important rationale behind private antitrust enforcement rests on Oliver Williamson’s
more general point (coined the problem of “selective intervention”) that public institutions cannot
replicate the incentives of private parties. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM (1985). We might expect the incentives of public enforcers to be insufficiently acute to
muster adequate policing and deterrence of antitrust violations.
111. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
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and police antitrust violations. Opponents argued that direct purchasers
would pass on most overcharges to subsequent buyers and thus would have
little reason to pursue violators and disrupt important supplier
relationships. 113 Both sides presented plausible, but unproven, arguments.
Recent scholarship has been more empirically grounded, and most
results suggest that denying standing to indirect purchasers has severely
hindered antitrust enforcement. Herbert Hovenkamp has cited the recent
Microsoft antitrust litigation as an illustration in which direct purchasers
avoided bringing suit against a powerful supplier and instead opted to pass
on antitrust injury to end consumers. 114 Contrary to the Landes-Posner
view in which direct purchasers launch antitrust suits when they reasonably
expect the suit to be successful, Hovenkamp suggests that direct purchasers
of Microsoft software understand that interrupting their lucrative
relationships with Microsoft might jeopardize their access to future
Microsoft products. 115 The AMC hearings have uncovered similar
instances where direct purchasers failed to pursue potential antitrust
violations and where indirect purchasers instead were the first to bring
suit. 116
Some scholars have further argued that the indirect purchaser rule not
only fails to deter antitrust violations, but in fact also encourages additional
antitrust violations. Because illegal cartels and monopolists can share rents
with direct purchasers without explicitly including them in an illegal
conspiracy (and threaten to boycott those who bring suit) antitrust violators
can manipulate the incentives of the only parties who have standing. Such
arrangements, dubbed “Illinois Walls” because they put illegal conduct
effectively beyond the reach of private antitrust enforcement, exploit the
weakness in the indirect purchaser rule and facilitate tacit cooperation
between antitrust violators and direct purchasers that is virtually impossible
to punish. 117 Recent scholarship has shown that such tacit collusion could
be supported effectively in a variety of distribution mechanisms, including
113. See supra note 81.
114. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917, 941–42
(2003) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001)).
115. Id.
116. Memorandum from the Antitrust Modernization Comm’n Staff to the Antitrust
Modernization Comm’n Comm’rs 12–13 (May 4, 2006), available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/
meetings/CivRem-IndP_DiscMemo060504-fin.pdf (summarizing testimony before the Commission).
117. Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra & Jakob Rüggeberg, Illinois Walls: How Barring
Indirect Purchaser Suits Facilitates Collusion (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
2005-02, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=730384. The authors argue that antitrust violators
could reach tacit agreements with direct purchasers to discourage lawsuits, such as through output
volume manipulation. Id. at 6.
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the manipulation of sales volume to allow direct purchasers to share in the
profit from the resulting scarcity. 118 Anecdotal evidence further supports
this theory, as direct purchasers were important contributors to several
recent high-profile illegal cartels. 119
Furthermore, removing indirect purchasers from the pool of potential
plaintiffs directly dilutes antitrust enforcement. Since optimal enforcement
is a function of both the penalty assessed to violators and the probability
that violations will be detected, precluding suits from available plaintiffs
necessarily reduces the probability of detection. 120 Additional private
enforcers might not be necessary if the Clayton Act’s implied likelihood of
detection—one in three—were not so optimistic. 121 To the contrary,
estimates of cartel detection rates run as low as 10 to 20 percent. 122
118. Id. at 9–13. See also Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra, Illinois Walls in Alternative
Market Structures (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=729843)
(demonstrating how Illinois Walls are robust enough to thrive in a variety of market arrangements).
119. Those examples include the Brand Name Prescription Drugs litigation involving cooperative
conduct between manufacturers and wholesalers, see In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litigation, Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1994 WL 663590 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1994), cartelization of the
lysine and citric acid markets by Archer Daniels Midland Company and others, as well as the Microsoft
case. Schinkel et al., supra note 117, at 28–31.
120. A logical extension of the informational advantages enjoyed by private enforcers is that these
advantages increase as the number of private enforcers rises. See supra note 110. See also Landes,
supra note 108, at 657. The true antecedents of this law and economics approach to calculating optimal
sanctions lies in Gary Becker’s work on criminal law. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
121. See infra note 122. This theory is true if one accepts that a particular antitrust violation has an
“optimal fine.” An optimal fine for an antitrust violation—drawing from theories of optimal punishment
for torts—would be the consequent economic harm divided by the probability the violator will be held
accountable. See Landes, supra note 108, at 657. Accordingly, any fine below the optimal amount
translates into underdeterrence (the situation in which we currently find ourselves) and any greater
amount translates into overdeterrence. The problem with this approach, however, arises in the situation
of supposed overdeterrence. Tort theory lends itself to the possibility of overdeterrence because
excessive tort penalties might deter socially efficient behavior (behavior in which a tortfeasor’s benefits
exceed the injury to a victim). But antitrust violations, by definition, are socially inefficient—if certain
economic conduct is deemed to increase surplus, even if it injures identifiable parties in the
marketplace, then it is not a violation of the Sherman Act. In the antitrust context, the problem of
overdeterrence can only arise if meritless suits are successfully brought, a problem that effective
judging can solve. Regardless of one’s view of whether antitrust violations have an optimal fine, by all
accounts it appears that the primary enforcement problem in antitrust is that of underdeterrence.
122. There is considerable uncertainty in the detection rate for cartels. See, e.g., Maurice E.
Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 458 (“The number of cartels
prosecuted annually could represent ten percent of all cartels operating today or ninety percent—
nobody knows.”). Stucke cites former Assistant Attorney General Douglas Ginsburg as estimating that
“antitrust enforcers detected no more than ten percent of all cartels,” id. at 457 n.35 (citing Sentencing
Options: Hearing Before the United States Sentencing Commission (1986), in UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION: UNPUBLISHED PUBLIC HEARINGS 1986 4, at 15 (1988)), and an
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) estimate of “one in six or seven,”
id. (citing COMPETITION COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., REPORT ON THE NATURE
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Additionally, defendants found to be culpable are paying far less than the
treble damages envisioned by the Clayton Act, and instead are paying
closer to single damages. 123
With these structural problems preventing adequate antitrust policing,
it comes as no surprise that the empirical evidence suggests that
international cartels are underpoliced. Recent studies indicate that cartels
are able to exact average overcharges that far exceed fines imposed. 124
Moreover, contrary to some beliefs that cartel behavior is inherently
unstable, studies of several long-term cartels indicate that those cartels over
time grew more stable, became more sophisticated in self-monitoring and
escaping detection, and imposed average overcharges that increased with
the life of the cartel. 125 Cartel activity has apparently increased in recent
years, and some scholars similarly estimate that monopolization is
inadequately deterred. 126 But this sort of illegal behavior is sensitive to
enforcement efforts, as recent empirical studies suggest that cartel
overcharges are lower in high-enforcement regimes. 127
In sum, Illinois Brick reflected the Supreme Court’s conviction that
antitrust sanctions and standing rules should be designed to deter
anticompetitive conduct, even at the expense of lost compensation for
injured parties. But in reality, the indirect purchaser rule has instead
contributed to underpolicing of antitrust violators and facilitated evasion of
antitrust enforcement.
IMPACT OF HARD CORE CARTELS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST CARTELS UNDER NATIONAL
COMPETITION LAWS 3, 13 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/20/2081831.pdf).
123. Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 115, 117–18 (1993).
124. John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for
Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TUL. L. REV. 513, 522–23, 545–46 (2005).
125. Yuliya Bolotova, Cartel Overcharges: An Empirical Analysis 22, 44 (Sept. 15, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=931211).
126. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L
L. 478, 479–80 (2000) (“Reductions in tariff barriers and the evolution of genuinely global markets in
many industries have helped create the conditions for the apparent increase in international cartel
activity to its highest level in decades.”). Daniel Karon has also noted that many market participants
prefer to fix prices and await weak enforcement. Daniel R. Karon, Price Fixing, Market Allocation and
Bid Rigging Conspiracies: How to Counsel Your Clients to Detect Violations and Inform You of
Potential Claims, 25 AM. J. TRIAL. ADVOC. 241, 255 (2001).
127. Bolotova, supra note 125, at 38.
AND
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C. INCREASED COMPLEXITY
The Supreme Court expressed concern over unwieldy litigation
complexity in virtually every indirect purchaser case. The Illinois Brick
Court, for example, was deeply concerned about the complexity in
calculating pass-on charges and allocating damages among the multiple
victims injured by a single antitrust violation. 128 It was largely this aversion
to complexity that compelled the Illinois Brick Court to seek a rule against
indirect purchaser standing, and the Court echoed this concern in
McCready 129 and UtiliCorp. 130 The aversion to complexity has been
justified by a motivation to preserve judicial resources, as well as a concern
that additional complexity would increase the risk of “duplicative
recoveries” 131 and “discourage vigorous enforcement” by private
parties. 132
It is likely, however, that the Court overstated the difficulty that
indirect purchaser suits would bring. Only two years after Illinois Brick,
Harris and Sullivan argued that although “adjudication to trace a particular
overcharge down its particular chain is a daunting one,” the task in many
128. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737 (1977) (suggesting that indirect purchaser suits
would “add whole new dimensions of complexity”).
129. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 475 n.11 (1982) (“[T]he task of disentangling
overlapping damages claims is not lightly to be imposed upon potential antitrust litigants, or upon the
judicial system.”).
130. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 208 (1990) (“The direct purchaser rule serves,
in part, to eliminate the complications of apportioning overcharges between direct and indirect
purchasers.”).
131. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 730–31. Hostility to multiple recoveries was an underlying premise
of the Illinois Brick decision. Id. at 731 (“[W]e are unwilling to ‘open the door to duplicative
recoveries.’”) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972)). It is unclear,
however, where the Court found the authority to prohibit multiple liability, and this is curious since all
successful plaintiffs recover a multiple of their injury in the form of treble damages. The assertion in
Standard Oil Co. about duplicative recoveries was made without analysis and without citation to a
supporting authority. The Supreme Court has nonetheless reiterated in subsequent rulings that any
standing rule should build off the premise that no antitrust violator should be punished twice for the
same violation. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 212 (“The Illinois Brick rule also serves to eliminate multiple
recoveries.”); McCready, 457 U.S. at 474 (confirming with precedent that a risk of duplicative recovery
was “unacceptable”) (citing Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 730–31).
Ultimately, there is a functional justification for prohibiting duplicative liability. Duplicative
liability within the modern, multilayered supply chain would provide a nearly endless number of
plaintiffs with claims that could push nearly any defendant into bankruptcy. But this justification has no
implications for limiting recovery for individual plaintiffs. Indeed, deterrence may be enhanced if
additional damages are awarded to any given plaintiff—perhaps one who discovers the violation, is first
to bring suit, or who undertakes the role of lead plaintiff. As much as a functional approach counsels
against imposing duplicative liability against a given defendant, it likewise counsels in favor of
flexibility in awarding multiple recovery to individual plaintiffs.
132. McCready, 457 U.S. at 475 n.11.
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cases might be simplified by applying institutional assumptions and
theoretical analysis. 133 More recently, Hovenkamp summarized an
assortment of proven methods to calculate passed-on overcharges, none of
which required an analysis materially more complex than other
determinations routinely required in antitrust litigation. For example, passon damages can be measured by the “yardstick” method, which looks to the
prevailing price in a geographic market that is similar (but not cartelized),
or by the “before-and-after” method, that looks to pre- or post-cartel prices
in the same market. 134 Both methods are routinely applied in antitrust
cases, including those by direct purchasers. 135 Therefore, far from
presenting an unmanageable level of complexity to antitrust enforcement,
damages calculations from indirect purchaser suits would appear to fall
well within the magnitude of complexity regularly tolerated in antitrust
law.
In any event, antitrust litigation is already—and inevitably—rife with
complex determinations. 136 Even the most fundamental tasks of antitrust
adjudication, such as determining the relevant market, routinely require
costly data collection, rigorous empirical estimations of prices and crosselasticities, and expensive expert testimony. The calculation of damages in
133. Harris & Sullivan, supra note 80, at 272–73. Responding to claims by Posner and Landes,
supra note 78, at 615–21, that pass-on calculations would involve a complex analysis of supply and
demand elasticities, Harris and Sullivan argued that such complexity would arise only in a short-run
analysis and that “[b]ecause in the long run supply is likely to be perfectly elastic . . . an estimate of
elasticity of demand will rarely be required . . . .” Harris & Sullivan, supra note 80, at 294 n.61a.
134. Hovenkamp, supra note 114, at 940–41. The yardstick method is described in HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 17.5b1, at
660–61 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining that “[a]djustments must probably be made for differences in taxes
and regulatory fees, costs of transportation, and different wage and salary rates. However, if these
differences can be isolated and quantified, an expert economist or accountant should be able to produce
a ‘reconstructed’ price that would have prevailed in the cartelized market if it had the same level of
competition as exists in the yardstick market”). For a description of the before-and-after method, see id.
§ 17.5b2, at 661–66. Other scholars have developed alternative methods to isolate and quantify the
antitrust harm that falls upon a direct purchaser even after some damages are passed-on to subsequent
buyers. See, e.g., Frank Verboven & Theon van Dijk, Cartel Damages Claims and the Passing-on
Defense (May 2007) (Working Paper, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=%201024469) (deriving a method, relying on relatively easy-to-observe variables, of estimating the
antitrust harms both to direct purchasers and to social welfare, including the damages resulting from
lost output).
135. See, e.g., Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 753, 761–62 (8th Cir.
2003) (applying the yardstick method); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 793–94 (6th
Cir. 2002) (applying regression analysis, before-and-after, and yardstick methods); In re
Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 428, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (accepting before-andafter method); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 964 F. Supp. 1454 (D. Kan. 1997) (accepting
before-and-after method).
136. This was well-recognized by the Illinois Brick dissenters. See supra note 42; Ill. Brick Co.,
431 U.S. at 759 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Reasoned estimation is required in all antitrust cases.”).
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indirect purchaser actions would merely join a long list of determinations
that already make antitrust enforcement complex, with which courts and
litigants have managed reasonably well. 137 Moreover, state courts have
exhibited a capacity to handle suits from indirect purchasers and to
calculate pass-on damages under Illinois Brick repealer statutes—federal
courts should be able to do the same.
Far more significant is that Illinois Brick has substantially increased,
not decreased, complexity in antitrust litigation. The Illinois Brick repealer
statutes have enabled indirect purchasers to pursue claims that are
foreclosed in federal court, thus spawning parallel state litigation and
creating a confusing mosaic of antitrust litigation. 138 These parallel actions
subject defendants to multiple and simultaneous litigation, force state
courts to entertain duplicative suits, and introduce legal confusion over
issues of jurisdiction and preemption. 139 This complexity is arguably far
above whatever might be introduced by pass-on calculations. One antitrust
scholar decried the current situation as a “logistical nightmare,” 140 and
another demanded, at the very least, some harmonization between federal
137. A notable exception has been recent cases reviewing challenges to proposed hospital
mergers. In this area of antitrust enforcement, courts have exhibited significant difficulty managing the
complex determinations and have received substantial scrutiny from several commentators. See, e.g.,
Jennifer R. Conners, A Critical Misdiagnosis: How Courts Underestimate the Anticompetitive
Implications of Hospital Mergers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 543, 562–70 (2003) (describing how courts have
erred, inter alia, in defining product markets, defining geographic markets, and in underestimating
market power); Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers and
Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 192 (1997) (“[C]ourts deciding hospital merger cases are asked
to make exceedingly fine-tuned appraisals of complex economic relationships . . . . Like pilots landing
at night aboard an aircraft carrier, courts are aiming for a target that is small, shifting and poorly
illuminated.”). See also Cory S. Capps et al., Antitrust Policy and Hospital Mergers: Recommendations
for a New Approach, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 677 (2002) (critiquing the methods used by courts in
hospital merger cases); Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price and
Non-Price Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727 (1999) (discussing the
difficulties courts encounter when attempting to apply traditional antitrust principles to hospital
mergers); James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers, 46
ANTITRUST BULL. 299 (2001) (noting errors courts have made using a critical loss analysis in merger
cases); Gregory J. Werden, The Limited Relevance of Patient Migration Data in Market Delineation for
Hospital Merger Cases, 8 J. HEALTH ECON. 363 (1989) (illustrating the limited utility of patient
migration date in antitrust analysis); Matthew Reiffer, Note, Antitrust Implications in Nonprofit
Hospital Mergers, 27 J. LEGIS. 187 (2001) (recognizing complexity of hospital mergers with respect to
antitrust). See generally Barak D. Richman, Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to
Basics (Duke Law Sch. Sci., Tech. & Innovation Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15, 2007), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=975152.
138. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
139. See Cavanagh, supra note 6, at 27–31, 33–34, 41.
140. Id. at 30 (“This proliferation of litigation of indirect purchaser cases involving a common
nucleus of operative fact with cases pending in federal court has created a logistical nightmare for the
courts.”).
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and state laws. 141 The disarray caused by partially overlapping state and
federal law in this area was a central justification for the AMC’s reform
recommendations. 142
The lesson from the history of the indirect purchaser doctrine is not
that the law should avoid engaging in complex calculations altogether—to
the contrary, the rule of reason and merger analysis embrace complexity. A
better approach to reducing complexity and administrative costs is to
improve procedural mechanisms. A system that could consolidate suits
arising from a common antitrust violation would avoid the parallel and
duplicative litigation, jurisdictional confusion, and nonuniformities in the
law that currently plague antitrust actions. Even though such consolidation
might increase the complexity of individual proceedings, it would make
significant strides toward conserving valuable judicial and litigation
resources.
IV. A NEW APPROACH
The heart of the indirect purchaser problem is actually one that is
familiar to other areas of law. A single act—in this case, an antitrust
violation—causes harm to a long chain of parties, all of whom can claim
injuries of varying amounts. 143 The policy challenge—dictated by the
normative objectives of antitrust law—is to impose the appropriate penalty
141. See Andrew I. Gavil, Federal Judicial Power and the Challenges of Multijurisdictional
Direct and Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 860, 863 (2001) (“[T]he
artificial division of cases that now flows from Illinois Brick imposes unnecessary litigation burdens on
the parties and leads to unjustifiable systemic inefficiencies. Ample ground should exist, therefore, to
construct a consensus for procedural reform directed at facilitating more efficient treatment of
substantively overlapping cases filed contemporaneously in multiple jurisdictions, state and federal.”).
142. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, SUMMARY OF INDIRECT PURCHASER HEARINGS
1 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-links/pdf/at-mod/indirectpurchaserhearings.pdf
(“Almost all of the speakers . . . viewed the current situation as entailing needlessly heavy costs and
burdens on the defendants.”). Illustrating the complexity, though without appreciating the irony, is the
ABA's Indirect Purchaser Litigation Handbook, a nearly 400-page volume that describes how attorneys
can initiate indirect purchaser suits and the unique litigation challenges they might encounter. Special
attention is given to jurisdiction, choice of law, discovery, and class action proceedings, whereas only
one chapter discusses the challenges of damage calculation. See generally ABA, INDIRECT PURCHASER
LITIGATION HANDBOOK (2007).
143. This might be described as the mirror situation of a multiparty tort, in which responsibility
for harm done to a plaintiff must be allocated to multiple defendants. A popular solution to the problem
of joint tortfeasors is joint and several liability, in which a prevailing plaintiff recovers the full amount
of injury from any tortfeasor while the defendants allocate damages among themselves through separate
proceedings. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Settlements Under Joint and Several
Liability, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 427 (1993); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages
Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831 (1989). Our proposal harnesses the wisdom of this
approach and applies it to the antitrust context.
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on the antitrust violator so as to achieve adequate deterrence, allocate the
penalty across the injured parties to satisfy the aims of compensation, and
manage the proceedings to minimize administrative costs. The solution
offered in Illinois Brick is to grant standing to only one party out of the
many injured parties, and to assign to that party both the responsibility for
identifying and pursuing the antitrust violation as well as the privilege of
collecting treble damages. 144 For the many reasons detailed above, this
model has proven to be inadequate: it has failed to deter violations, does
not compensate injured parties, and has resulted in substantial
administrative complexity. 145
We offer a policy solution that improves the status quo along all three
normative criteria. Our proposed mechanism would consolidate the claims
of all injured parties into a single proceeding, designate a lead plaintiff, and
then allocate damages to participating parties. It opens standing to include
indirect purchasers, thus increasing the number of potential plaintiffs and
securing compensation for all injured parties. In this respect we endorse the
AMC’s recommendation to repeal Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe. Yet our
proposal also secures certain rewards to parties who bring suit, and thus
instills strong incentives to detect and punish antitrust violations. In this
sense it shares similarities to proposals advanced by the American Antitrust
Institute and other groups critical of the AMC’s recommendations. In this
part, we describe the elements of our proposal, illustrating how it would be
implemented and documenting the influence from lessons learned in
parallel areas of the law.
A. BEYOND ILLINOIS BRICK REPEAL: CREATING A SINGLE, MANDATORY
CAUSE OF ACTION
With multiparty supply chains becoming the rule more than the
exception in the modern economy, any antitrust violation is likely to cause
harm, in varying degrees, to multiple parties. This problem arises in several
areas of law. For example, mass torts involve a single tortfeasor and
multiple victims; violations of securities laws injure many stockholders,
each of whom have claims of different sizes; and bankruptcies involve
many parties that have claims of competing magnitude and priority against
a single entity.
The one commonality that emerges from each of these areas of law is
the desirability of consolidating all of the plaintiffs’ claims, and all issues
144.
145.

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.

102

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:69

that require litigation, into one proceeding. Mass torts are widely
recognized to pose substantial administrative challenges, with many
parties, common issues, and different claims, and the rise of the class action
reflects the widely held belief that there is significant value to consolidating
multiple tort claims. 146 Bankruptcy law also offers a framework in which
potential claimants are required to join a single consolidated proceeding, or
otherwise forfeit any potential recovery. And securities law offers
derivative lawsuits and securities class actions as mechanisms to
consolidate multiple claims into unified actions, a process that has been
affirmed under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”). 147
These benefits transfer easily into the antitrust arena, and the Supreme
Court clearly saw the merits of consolidation when it decided Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick. By preventing indirect purchasers from bringing
suit and permitting the direct purchaser to sue for amounts that exceeded its
losses, the Court’s combined rulings effectively consolidated all claims
within the direct purchaser’s suit. The AMC, even though it advocates
repealing Illinois Brick, also finds consolidation appealing and has
recommended devising mechanisms to transfer state claims to federal
court. 148
Consolidation thus has a very strong appeal, but without an effective
procedural framework, it may be vulnerable to the threat that a single party
can opt out of a consolidated hearing, bring a stand-alone suit, and
undermine many of the benefits consolidation is designed to achieve. This
problem has received significant scholarly attention, particularly in the
mass tort context, and some scholars have proposed “mandatory”
consolidated actions in which class members would be prohibited from
bringing parallel suits. 149 This approach lends itself particularly well to
antitrust. The logic motivating mandatory consolidated actions is to place
priority on deterrence and ex ante expected compensation rather than
strategic litigation and competitive rent seeking, even if the latter strategies
yield greater compensation for individual parties. Since antitrust has always
placed exceptional weight on social welfare arguments—such as deterrence
and minimizing complexity—a mandatory consolidated action is a natural
146. It goes without saying that the class action remains a point of contention and criticism.
Reform efforts, however, have not rejected the value of consolidation, but instead try to filter out claims
that have little legal or factual support. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2,
119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
147. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000).
148. See AMC REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, at 18.
149. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED & DAVID ROSENBERG, MAKING TORT LAW: WHAT SHOULD BE
DONE AND WHO SHOULD DO IT 89–90 (2003).
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fit.
We therefore propose reforming the Clayton Act to provide for a
single consolidated action against antitrust violators that allows all injured
parties—direct and indirect—to join in the same suit. Either a direct or an
indirect purchaser may initiate the antitrust action, after which other parties
claiming injury may join. No other action, however, may be brought
against the defendant for the same illegal conduct, and all parallel state
causes of action would be preempted. 150 This approach would expand
compensation to all parties, including indirect purchasers, that claim and
demonstrate injury. Additionally, litigation complexity and its associated
administrative costs would be substantially reduced by eliminating parallel
litigation and forcing all causes of action into one federal suit. 151
The greatest gains, however, would be in enhancing deterrence, where
the greatest improvement is needed. The pool of potential plaintiffs would
expand substantially, thereby increasing the probability that an antitrust
violation would be detected and punished. 152 Also, a mandatory
consolidated action would facilitate the consolidation of all injured parties,
thereby ensuring that damages reflect to the extent possible the total
economic injury caused by a violator’s unlawful conduct. It would also
disrupt collusion between violators and direct purchasers, since a suit may
150. Although federal preemption of state law is always a politically sensitive matter, preemption
of state indirect purchaser causes of action should be politically palatable so long as it is accompanied
by a grant of indirect purchaser recovery at the federal level. Indeed, the impetus for the so-called
Illinois Brick repealer statutes was to provide compensation to indirect purchasers. See supra notes 82–
84 and accompanying text.
151. We propose a new consolidation mechanism, in part, because even if Illinois Brick were
overturned, the methods currently provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to combine claims
of multiple plaintiffs against a common defendant (under Rules 23 and 19) would fail to consolidate the
claims of direct and indirect purchasers. Certification for class actions under Rule 23, for example,
would likely fail for lack of a common question of fact because the plaintiffs at different levels of the
distribution chain present different causal mechanisms of injury. The repeated failures of tobacco
plaintiffs to certify classes highlight this issue. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 135
(3d Cir. 1998) (decertifying class where causation of tobacco-related injury varied among plaintiff
smokers); id. at 143–44 n.19 (collecting cases). At the same time, joinder under Rule 19 is infeasible
with large numbers of parties, such as one could expect from cases involving indirect purchaser pools
that include end-users.
152. A common criticism of consolidated actions is that their size and potential payoff for
plaintiffs might fuel a flood of meritless suits, and some might fear a similar flood from our proposal
(especially when combined with repealing Illinois Brick’s ban on indirect purchaser suits). We
emphasize that courts would still have to apply the antitrust standing rules, such as the remoteness test
articulated in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983). See supra note 65 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit
demonstrated in Loeb Industries, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2002), how, even after
sidestepping Illinois Brick, courts may nevertheless deny standing on remoteness grounds. See supra
note 69.
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be initiated by indirect purchasers and direct purchasers must decide
immediately whether to join the action. In short, this consolidated
proceeding would both bring down the Illinois Walls and elevate fines to
the level required to deter future violations.
B. LEARNING FROM THE PSLRA: DESIGNATING A LEAD PLAINTIFF
A consolidated proceeding presents two questions: how to encourage
the initiation of the litigation, and who ultimately controls the litigation for
the diverse collection of injured plaintiffs. The first question is especially
critical for antitrust actions, where the propensity to detect and pursue an
antitrust violation is central to deterring misconduct, and the second
question becomes critical if claims are organized into a mandatory
consolidated action. There might be some appeal to offering the entirety of
treble damages to the first party—whether a direct or indirect purchaser—
to identify a violation and bring suit. Though this would leave many injured
parties uncompensated, it would heighten deterrence by steepening the
incentives to detect violations, and it translates into a single action without
the need for complex calculations. This proposal would amount to a “race
to the courthouse,” and is akin to the current Illinois Brick rule but without
imposing restrictions on the identity of the plaintiff or presuming who the
optimal plaintiff is. It would grant standing not categorically to the direct
purchaser but to whoever first sues an alleged antitrust violator. 153 The
question of control over a consolidated action might be handled similarly,
where the first to initiate the suit would enjoy control over negotiations,
litigation strategy, and ultimately attorneys’ fees.
The problems of managing a multiplaintiff proceeding are well-known
in securities law, and addressing those issues was a key motivation behind
the PSLRA. 154 The race-to-the-courthouse problem arises when plaintiffs’
153. This is parallel to a “bonus system” for securities suits, in which the first plaintiff receives a
reward meant to compensate costs of bringing the suit and to counteract the free-rider problem caused
by class certification, collateral estoppel, and any other mechanism that would allow later parties to
benefit from the first-mover’s expenses. See, e.g., Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp.
294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding incentive awards to class representatives as falling within the
court’s discretion, and outlining the factors for consideration). See generally Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV.
1303 (2006) (justifying incentive awards as compensation for the additional risks and costs borne by
class representatives).
154. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737,
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000)). See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform:
The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW.
335, 337–38 (1996) (explaining that one of the three prime motivations behind the Act was reforming
securities class actions to better serve the interest of investors, rather than attorneys). See also H.R. REP.
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lawyers scramble to take charge of the class action in order to claim the
accompanying fees, and though they may instill optimal incentives, they
tend to generate neither optimal behaviors nor optimal plaintiffs. Courts are
flooded with meritless claims, which attorneys are motivated to file before
they can properly evaluate the virtues of a suit. 155 Moreover, often the
attorneys fortuitous enough to have arrived first may not be effective
managers of the case, and the clients they represent (who must represent
the class) may be unsophisticated or lack sufficient financial motivation to
monitor their attorneys and push for an outcome that maximizes value to
the class, rather than just to counsel. 156
The deterrent effect of private enforcement of the antitrust laws can be
enhanced by anticipating the inefficiencies of multiplaintiff litigation.
Effective deterrence is possible only when plaintiffs can win—not just
file—antitrust actions, and a first-to-file system opens the possibility to
poorly-skilled but speedy plaintiffs filing actions, losing the case, and then
precluding claims from other injured parties. Placing such a premium on
speed—tempting the fleet with an enormous reward for a victorious suit—
would also induce false or poorly conceived claims, thus hindering and
deterring procompetitive and otherwise legal conduct. Finally, there are
social gains from granting a claim to a plaintiff who is capable of handling
the complexities of a case and whose incentives are aligned with social
preferences. This is particularly important during the settlement process,
NO. 104-369, at 31–35 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730–34 (describing
the importance of measures enacted to better manage litigation, including a method for determining the
“most adequate plaintiff”).
155. Avery, supra note 154, at 375. See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 732 (“Most often speed has replaced diligence in drafting complaints.”);
John F. Olson, David C. Mahaffey & Brian E. Casey, Pleading Reform, Plaintiff Qualification and
Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 1101, 1104–07 (1996) (providing a brief history
of the “race to the courthouse” tradition and its impact upon drafting PSLRA and describing frequency
of hastily drafted and error-ridden complaints filed within days of a stock price drop and “professional
plaintiffs” essentially on standby).
156. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32–33 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730
(“Floor debate in the Senate highlighted that many of the ‘world's unluckiest investors’ repeatedly
appear as lead plaintiffs in securities class action lawsuits. . . . Lead plaintiffs are not entitled to a
bounty for their services. Individuals who are motivated by the payment of a bounty or bonus should
not be permitted to serve as lead plaintiffs. These individuals do not adequately represent other
shareholders—in many cases the ‘lead plaintiff’ has not even read the complaint.”). The conflicts of
interest between counsel predisposed to accepting a settlement that is low but that adequately provides
for fees, rather than a settlement that maximizes value for the plaintiff was well known to proponents of
the PSLRA. Avery, supra note 154, at 372. The PSLRA deals with these by requiring that plaintiffs
certify having reviewed and authorized the complaint, as well as recite that they did not purchase a
security solely at the direction of their lawyer. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(2); Avery, supra note 154, at
375.
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where most of these cases are resolved and where the danger is greatest for
unsupervised attorneys to pursue resolutions that do not serve their clients’
interests. 157
These observations, in part, compelled Congress to replace the race to
the courthouse that governed most securities class actions with a “lead
plaintiff provision” in the PSLRA. 158 The lead plaintiff provision provides
a mechanism in which the court can select one plaintiff to lead securities
class actions. Following the filing of a securities class action, notice must
be given to alert all potential class members of the filed complaint, and all
purported members are permitted to join the action. 159 Within sixty days
after notice is given, any class member may move the court to serve as the
lead plaintiff, and the court is charged with selecting a plaintiff to direct the
claim and lead the class. 160 Though the PSLRA contains a presumption that
the plaintiff with the greatest economic stake in the action will be named
the lead plaintiff, the court enjoys discretion to appoint another lead
plaintiff upon proof that the presumptive lead plaintiff will not adequately
represent or protect the interests of the class. 161
As part of our mandatory consolidated action, we propose a lead
plaintiff provision modeled on the similar provision in the PSLRA.
Following the initiation of an antitrust suit and after appropriate notice is
given, other parties claiming injury may join, after which the action
becomes closed. 162 At this point, the court will entertain requests by the
157. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 525–26 (1991) (describing one study which found that less than 5
percent of the securities litigations pending in 1987 ever went to trial, and a smaller study which found
that 83 percent of securities cases filed in Dallas federal district court settled). See also Mukesh Bajaj,
Sumon C. Mazumdar & Atulya Sarin, Securities Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Analysis 9
(Nov. 17, 2000) (Working Paper, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=258
027).
Identifying an optimal plaintiff—one that can manage complex litigation and has incentives aligned
with social preferences—is especially important in antitrust cases, where many antitrust actions follow
an inquiry by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. If private actions follow
government investigations, rather than playing leading roles in detecting and punishing anticompetitive
conduct, then the motives behind rewarding the swift are entirely undermined. For these reasons, it is
wise to incorporate discretion in the selection of the plaintiff, rather than leaving it to a race.
158. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 27(a)(3)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1.
See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32–35 (Conf. Rep.) (addressing the problems of “professional
plaintiffs” and other class control concerns).
159. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 27(a)(3)(A)(i).
160. Id.; Id. § 27(a)(3)(B).
161. Id. § 27(a)(3)(B)(iii).
162. This mechanism would also be available for a private class action following a suit by the
government. Since private claims often follow government antitrust victories, a mandatory class action
would organize the claims and administer a settlement more swiftly and efficiently than the morass of
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suing parties to lead the action and will designate a lead plaintiff. 163 The
court’s designation would be directed by two guiding principles: first, a
presumption in favor of the party who initiated the suit, and second, a
presumption in favor of the party claiming the greatest damages. The first
presumption is designed to enhance the incentives for potential plaintiffs to
bring suit, and the second presumption (modeled after the PSLRA) is
designed to identify the party best capable of handling the litigation and
representing the preferences of the joined plaintiffs. 164 The court would be
instructed to balance these two, potentially competing, presumptions while
maintaining the same discretion that is afforded to courts under the
PSLRA. 165 Such a balance is a necessary product of trying to design an
efficiently administered proceeding that incentivizes the initiation of
suits—with the prospect of control, attorneys’ fees, and perhaps additional
compensation—while avoiding a destructive race to the courthouse.
Enabling the court to appoint a lead plaintiff would also establish a
responsible monitor for the antitrust action. The lead plaintiff would be
required to take due care in articulating the theory of the claim, which not
only assists the court but also increases the likelihood of the plaintiffs’
success, and thus the effectiveness of deterring other anticompetitive
conduct. The lead plaintiff would also be firmly positioned to guide the
settlement process, which is where most antitrust claims are effectively
resolved, and this consideration could play a large part in determining who
will become the lead plaintiff. Although several elements of the PSLRA
have received mixed reviews in its first ten years, there is good evidence
that the lead plaintiffs in securities cases, which tend to be institutional
parallel and competing suits that now follow a government conviction.
163. Our proposal also permits the possibility of allowing subclasses of plaintiffs to each have its
own counsel and lead subplaintiff.
164. A distinction should be drawn between weighing the relative magnitude of claims as part of a
balancing to determine the lead plaintiff at the start of litigation and the more precise allocation of
damages that would come after a successful prosecution of a private enforcement action. In the first
stage, the judge weighs a non-dispositive factor and selects who among several plaintiffs should serve
as the lead plaintiff, a decision that would fall within that judge’s discretion. A more rigorous allocation
would be required for the subsequent allocation of damages.
165. These presumptions are not dispositive (that is, they are merely presumptions), and in
selecting a lead plaintiff, the presiding judge maintains discretion to consider the many other factors
that judges currently enjoy in selecting a lead plaintiff for PSLRA actions. Those considerations might
include the quality of a potential lead plaintiff’s counsel, the representativeness of that plaintiff for the
other parties, and the likelihood of reaching a reasonable settlement. Like selections of lead plaintiffs
under the PSLRA, these selections would eschew a formulaic approach and instead adopt a case-bycase balancing of these factors that can reward a plaintiff’s initiative while also taking stock of potential
plaintiffs’ relative motivations and resources going forward.
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investors, have managed to generate higher settlement values and negotiate
better fee structures with law firms, thereby reducing agency costs. 166
C. ALLOCATING DAMAGES
The third, and final, element in our proposal would come at the end of
the litigation or settlement. After a lead plaintiff is assigned to manage the
mandatory consolidated action, and after that lead plaintiff has either
reached an overall settlement with the defendant or received a judgment
following trial, a third proceeding will allocate the total sum of damages
among the separate parties.
This proceeding would engage in the very calculations that the Illinois
Brick and Hanover Shoe Courts feared were wrought with complexity.
Although there should be no illusions that this would be a simple
determination, it should not be an excessively difficult task. As was
discussed above, recent scholarship allays concerns that courts are illprepared to conduct this determination. 167 Calculating demand elasticity,
which intimidated the Illinois Brick Court, would not be routinely required
to compute the pass-on determinations, 168 and Hovenkamp has proposed a
variety of effective methods, such as yardstick determinations, to assess
passed-on overcharges that involve no demanding calculations. 169 Courts
have proven capable of making these calculations in other antitrust
cases, 170 and so this final determination should be no more difficult.
V. CONCLUSION
The Illinois Brick doctrine has proven to be an inadequate solution to
a problem that is growing in severity, and the upcoming thirtieth
anniversary of the Illinois Brick decision has served as a battle cry for
reform. Despite a growing consensus for reform to the doctrine, however,
the debate has been constrained by an undue emphasis on legal formalism
and has failed to generate innovative solutions. Our approach returns to the
rudiments of antitrust. We both base our critique of the current doctrine and
166. Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes
During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1505–06 (2006) (citations
omitted); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1624 (2006) (finding that
institutional investors increase the value of resulting settlements when serving as lead plaintiffs).
167. See supra Part III.C.
168. See Harris & Sullivan, supra note 80, at 337–38.
169. HOVENKAMP, supra note 134, § 17.5b1–2.
170. See cases cited supra note 135.
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develop our proposed reform on antitrust’s core functional objectives.
Meaningful reform of the indirect purchaser rule requires a comprehensive
approach that begins with these principles and strives for innovative
solutions.
We model the problem of antitrust standing as a challenge to organize
the antitrust claims of multiple parties within a single distribution chain.
This approach directly confronts the pervasiveness of multilayer supply
chains and the reality that most antitrust violations impose varying injuries
on multiple downstream parties. This type of challenge is not materially
different from similar problems encountered in administering mass torts or
violations of securities law, and we borrow from the experiences in those
related areas of law to craft a solution. We ultimately propose a three-part
administrative mechanism to replace the current Illinois Brick doctrine: a
mandatory consolidated action, a court-appointed lead plaintiff, and an
administrative hearing to allocate damages. We recognize that this
approach is substantially different from proposals generated by the policy
community thus far, but we hope it is greeted as a constructive contribution
that will become part of a larger search for innovative and comprehensive
approaches to rewriting antitrust rules of standing.
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